El presente estudio sirve de Prefacio a nuestra traducción del libro de Jean-Luc Marion: Cuestiones cartesianas. Método y Metafísica, Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2012, pp. 9-40 (ISBN 978-987-574-463-9). Presentamos aquí el primer volumen de las Cuestiones Cartesianas, publicado por primera vez en 1991, y dedicado, como lo indica su subtítulo, a la relación, o mejor, a las sucesivas relaciones, a lo largo del corpus cartesiano, entre método y metafísica. Aunque se presentan como una recopilación de estudios autónomos, y son tales, la (...) significación de estas cuestiones, y la radicalidad del cuestionamiento que ellas plantean, deben entenderse por el lugar que ellas ocupan en la totalidad de la obra que J.-L. Marion dedicara a la filosofía de Descartes, esto es, en una doble continuidad. En primer lugar, estas cuestiones no se acaban aquí y se continúan en otro volumen, publicado cinco años después, bajo el mismo título y dedicado a los dos entes, ego y Dios, que se erigen, alternativamente, en principios de la metafísica cartesiana. A su vez, el conjunto de las cuestiones cartesianas continúan, sin perder su autonomía, la densa trilogía que las antecede, en la cual sus dos pares de problemas, método y metafísica, ego y Dios, y sus distintas articulaciones, se plantean desde el primer momento de una larga investigación en la que las sucesivas interpretaciones aspiran a una interpretación global y nunca definitiva, dirigida a la ardua (re)constitución de la metafísica que Descartes lleva a cabo, o mejor, y en sentido más general, a la situación historial de la metafísica de Descartes. En lo que sigue, exponemos las tesis principales de esos tres libros, a saber: Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes. Science cartésienne et savoir aritotélicien dans les Regulae, Paris, Vrin, 1975, 1981, 1992, 2000; Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des vérités éternelles, fondement, Paris, PUF, 1981, 1991; Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie cartésienne, Paris, PUF, 1986, 2000. (Hay traducciones al español y al inglés). Luego, exponemos crìticamente los estudios contendis en el libro que introducimos, Cuestiones Cartsianas. Mètodo y Metafìsica para finalmente discutir el lugar que la exègesis cartesiana ocupa en la obra filosófica general de Jean-Luc Marion. (shrink)

Heidegger’s famous critique of the onto-theo-logy accuses the whole Western metaphysics of having led us to a “forgetfulness of being”. The following pages pay attention to two attempts to respond to this attack: Marion’s, who prefers, with Heidegger, to liberate God from the realms of being; Gilson’s, who attributed to Thomas Aquinas a natural theology in a certain discontinuity with classical metaphysics. Secondly, this article intends to propose a clearer continuity between the Christian concept of God and Aristotelian ontology (...) in particular, which is itself open. (shrink)

This study investigates the debt owed by contemporary theological anthropology to the philosophical anthropology of the first half of the twentieth century (considered in its interest in interpersonal character of human identity). It should be recognized that there was a fairly complex relationship between them: sometimes anthropology ended up in some way forgetting theology, sometimes theology was sustained by anthropology and, often, invited to self-criticism. Analyzing «pneumatological» anthropology (and its Christological roots) elaborated by Ferdinand Ebner (1882- 1931) helps theological anthropology (...) not to forget that its method of investigation has to clarify both sides of the analogy between God and man in order to fully integrate the «expressive» meaning of both logics: theo-logic and anthropo-logic. (shrink)

Se explora la naturaleza de los problemas lacunae a partir del análisis de los conceptos elaborados, respectivamente, por Larry Laudan, Theo Kuipers y Atocha Aliseda. Sugeriré que los problemas lacunae pueden surgir del debilitamiento de la noción de ‘falsación empírica’ y repercutir en la noción de ‘implicación lógica’.

Reshaping the neo-Aristotelian doctrines about the human soul was Descartes’s most spectacular enterprise, which gave birth to some of the sharpest debates in the Republic of Letters. Neverthe- less, it was certainly Descartes’s intention, as already expressed in the Discours de la méthode, to show that his new metaphysics could be supplemented with experimental research in the field of medicine and the conservation of life. It is no surprise then that several natural philosophers and doctors, such as Henricus Regius from (...) Utrecht, who had studied in Padua with William Harvey, rallied in support, in order to gain a more substantial theoretical basis for their research. Taking as his ground some general metaphysical assumptions, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and perhaps the separability of the pure understanding, Regius intended to secure a new philosophy of man, which was able to reflect his medical interests and complement his account of human nature. This is the story that is now gaining currency, and it is surely accurate, at least in part. Desmond Clarke has recently defended the same view1, based on the remarkable studies of the Utrecht scholars Theo Verbeek and Erik-Jan Bos. Here I would like to challenge some aspects of this view and ask how Regius, who was perceived as the philosopher most closely associated with Descartes, became a betrayer of his mentor. (shrink)

Nghiên cứu thực hiện khảo sát 370 người tiêu dùng sử dụng ví điện tử và đang sinh sống tại TP. Thủ Dầu Một, tỉnh Bình Dương, nhằm mục tiêu xác định, đánh giá và đo lường các yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến ý định sử dụng ví điện tử của người tiêu dùng. Kết quả nghiên cứu cho thấy, có 4 yếu tố có ảnh hưởng tích cực đến Ý định sử dụng ví điện tử của người tiêu dùng (...) tại TP. Thủ Dầu Một, được sắp xếp theo thứ tự từ mạnh đến yếu, đó là: (i) Nhận thức riêng tư/bảo mật; (ii) Nhận thức dễ sử dụng; (iii) Ảnh hưởng xã hội; (iv) Nhận thức hữu ích. Bài viết cũng đề xuất với nhà cung cấp dịch vụ ví điện tử các giải pháp nhằm cải thiện, khắc phục những điểm hạn chế, từ đó nâng cao chất lượng và đáp ứng nhu cầu của người tiêu dùng. (shrink)

In the fourteenth plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop a dichotomy between two kinds of space – the smooth and the striated. What I want to focus on in this chapter is the status of these two conceptions of space. As Deleuze and Guattari note, these two forms of space are only discovered in a mixed form, yet are capable of being analysed de jure through their separation. In this sense, the plateau on the smooth and striated (...) can be seen as something like a transcendental deduction of their ontology of spaces. I will explore what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say that they want to construct a theo-noology of smooth and striated spaces. I want to look at the ethical implications of this distinction, before looking at some alternative approaches to the issue of space. It should be noted that the question of the striation of space is one that is shared by Bergson, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre among others. The novelty of Deleuze and Guattari’s account is in their formulation of the notion of smooth space as a response. I will begin by looking at the notion of striated space itself, and in particular will explore the degree to which we should see it as a structure or as a method, and the interrelation between these two characterisations. (shrink)

Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität / Archivzentrum UBA Ffm Bestand Na 60 Beschreibung Identifikation (kurz) Laufzeit: 1950-1994 -/- Bestandsgeschichte: Jürgen Habermas (geb. 1929), Professor für Philosophie und Sozio-logie an der Goethe-Universität (1964-1971, 1975-1982 und 1983-1994) und Direktor des Max-Planck-Instituts zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt, ab 1980 Max-Planck-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, (1971-1981), gilt als einer der bedeutendsten lebenden deutschen Philosophen der Gegenwart. Ha-bermas rezipierte die Kritische Theorie und entwickelte darüber hinausgehende Theo-rien in der Sozialphilosophie. Die Unterlagen wurden von Jürgen Habermas im (...) Frühjahr 2010 an das Archivzentrum abgegeben. Findmittel: verzeichnet Weitere Angaben (Bestand) Zusatzinformationen: Der Vorlass von Jürgen Habermas ist komplett verzeichnet, je-doch nur für die Korrespondenzen 1954 - 1994 online freigeschaltet. Alle anderen Ver-zeichnungseinheiten sind hier nicht einsehbar. Gliederung: 1. Korrespondenzen 2. Lehre und wissenschaftliche Arbeit 3. Monographien und Aufsatzbände 4. Sammlungen -/- https://arcinsys.hessen.de/arcinsys/llist?nodeid=g156869&page=1&reload=true&sorting=41 . (shrink)

Unquestionably, Restorative Justice (hereafter RJ) has finally gathered some real momentum. It has become a sine qua non topic in many national and international policy and statutory agendas. However, as the restorative practice expands to deal with crimes, ages and situations it has never addressed before (at least in its contemporary version), and as its application starts to make sense not only to national but also to regional and international bodies and fora, new theoretical problems are posed. In the fast-growing (...) literature many theories and Schools have been evoked to support RJ's claims. This paper will take the discussion a step back by looking at questions of meta-theoretical character. In particular, the paper will ask: Does RJ have a place in the “world of theories,” and if it does, then what kind of theory is it, and on what level should it be placed? Second, does RJ theory need a philosophy, and why? Finally, how can restorative practices be morally justified? (shrink)

This book takes bold steps in forming much-needed philosophical foundations for restorative justice through deconstructing and reconstructing various models of thinking. It challenges current debates through the consideration and integration of various disciplines such as law, criminology, philosophy and human rights into restorative justice theory, resulting in the development of new and stimulating arguments. Topics covered include the close relationship and convergence of restorative justice and human rights, some of the challenges of engagement with human rights, the need for the (...) recognition of the teachings of restorative justice at both the theoretical and the applied level, the Aristotelian theory on restorative justice, the role of restorative justice in schools and in police practice and a discussion of the humanistic African philosophy of Ubuntu. With international contributions from various disciplines and through the use of value based research methods, the book deconstructs existing concepts and suggests a new conceptual model for restorative justice. This unique book will be of interest to academics, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners. (shrink)

Although the fast-growing literature on restorative justice is extensive, and in some regards repetitive, there is still no consensus as to the nature and extent of applicability of the restorative notion. This article claims that the restorative movement is experiencing a tension between normative abolitionist and pragmatic visions of restorative justice. It proceeds to identify six conceptual fault-lines that characterize this tension. These do not only refer to various definitional positions, but also disagreements that negatively affect both the theoretical and (...) practical development of restorative justice. These tensions also encourage a power-interest battle between different stakeholders within the restorative movement including practitioners, theoreticians, researchers and policy makers. To approach these controversies, there needs to be an acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of the conceptual problem of restorative justice and the impact it has on its application. The article attempts to get to grips with this problem, and provide a common ground for the future development of restorative justice. (shrink)

The chapter revisits the relationship between restorative justice and punishment through the eyes of Classical Greek philosophy and tragedy, the School of Collectivists, and contemporary thinkers. The extant literature sees restorative justice either as alternative punishment or an alternative to punishment. This chapter puts forward the notion of restorative punishment by deconstructing the concept of pain, and by reconstructing a new vision through the notion of catharsis. The chapter then takes a bold step in proposing a philosophical framework to justify (...) the normative thinking underpinning its proposed concept of restorative punishment and pain. (shrink)

Although community cohesion and human rights are currently two of the most discussed political discourses in the UK, their links for policy are underplayed. This article presents the findings of a nine-month research project that included interviews with a selected expert sample, and which aimed to explore whether human rights values and legislation can be used as tools for community cohesion. Available levers within human rights and the 1998 Human Rights Act are identified, and evidence-based policy recommendations are posited. The (...) article aims to start a new and more inclusive dialogue on community cohesion policy. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to continue the discussion on Europe’s converging criminal justice systems. In particular, I test a hypothesis that has recently appeared in the literature, which sees the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as one of the most significant factors that encourage a harmonization process between the adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems of Europe. This claim is supported by examining the Court’s jurisprudence to identify decisions that led to legislative and policy amendments (...) in the domestic legal orders of the 46 member states of the Council of Europe. This account shows how an interplay currently taking place between judicial, policy, and statutory powers is marking the end of the adversarial-inquisitorial era. Finally, the conclusion identifies the three most important impediments that are likely to hamper this harmonization process. (shrink)

Restorative justice (RJ) in the secure estate is widespread internationally, although piecemeal and inconsistent in its application. It exists in the form of many practices such as mediation, conferencing, circles, and panels. As the interest in RJ continues to grow, this research takes a step back to ask how reconcilable RJ is with incapacitation. Through a combination of normative thinking, literature review, and primary research that applied qualitative methodologies over a 3-year period, the article examines where the two notions meet (...) in their intentions and expected outcomes. A new classification of restorative practices in prisons is proposed, placed in the context of case studies of existing programs from around the world. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in (deRosset and Fine, 2023). In that paper, we very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.

Providing equitable food security for a growing population while minimizing environmental impacts and enhancing resilience to climate shocks is an ongoing challenge. Here, we quantify the resource intensity, environmental impacts and nutritional output of a small (0.075 ha) low-input subsistence Mediterranean agroecological farm in a developed nation that is based on intercropping and annual crop rotation. The farm provides one individual, the proprietor, with nutritional self-sufficiency (adequate intake of an array of macro- and micro-nutrients) with limited labor, no synthetic fertilizers (...) or herbicides, and zero waste, effectively closing a full farm-table-farm cycle. We find that the agroecological farm outperforms conventional farming as practiced in the same country in terms of both lower environmental burdens, across all examined environmental metrics (63% lower on average) per kg produce, and higher nutritional score (66% higher on average). Per equal farmland, the environmental lopsidedness was even higher (79% lower than conventional farming on average), with nearly the same nutritional score (3% lower on average). Moreover, when considering total land area, which includes farmland and supporting non-agricultural lands, as well as postgate impacts and food losses, the advantage of the agroecological system over conventional farming is even more pronounced. Situated within a Mediterranean region that is undergoing rapid climate change, this food system is a unique case study of nutrition- and environment-oriented food production system. While its deployment potential is limited by lack of supportive policies, it nonetheless represents one of the most starkly bold alternatives to current food systems. (shrink)

‘Justice’ is spoken of in two ways: the lawful and the fair. The law is a human construct that is devoted to the advantage of all, or to the advantage of the best, or to the advantage of those in power or to the advantage of those representing it – let it be the politician, the media, the TV presenter, the filmmaker. Thus, the law serves the production or the preservation of happiness within politics and business. The law commands us (...) to act according to the mean. A well-written law follows the mean well and a poorly written law does not. On the other hand, fairness is a principle sometimes materialised through the law and the given justice system. Fairness is the ultimate value pursued by both the common law and civil law traditions. However, its distribution through the law and the representation of this delivery varies. Does this mean that a different kind of justice is distributed? Through the teachings of Aristotle, this essay aims to deconstruct the notion of justice, by breaking down its two ingredients, the lawful and the fair, and by analysing the effect of their representation in modern European society. The relativity attached to the notion of justice is not a modern phenomenon, but a philosophical matter that can be analysed and indeed explained through the teachings of Aristotle and its contemporary students. The analysis will be developed in the context of convergent Europe, focusing on the role of the media and courts especially in relation to criminal justice. (shrink)

We are living in a world where power abuse has become the new norm, as well as the biggest, silent driver of persistent inequalities, racism and human rights violations. As humanity is getting to grips with socio-economic consequences that can only be compared with those that followed World War II, this timely book challenges current thinking, while creating a much needed normative and practical framework for revealing and challenging the power structures that feed our subconscious feelings of despair and defeatism. (...) Structured around the four concepts of power - race - justice - restorative justice, the book uses empirical new data and normative analysis to reconstruct the way we prevent power abuse and harm at the inter-personal, inter-community and international levels. This book offers new lenses, which allow us to view power, race and justice in a modern reality where communities have been silenced, but through restorative justice are gaining voice. The book is enriched with twenty-five case studies written by survivors, practitioners and those with direct experiences of power abuse and inequality. Through robust research methodologies, Gavrielides' new monograph reveals new forms of slavery, while creating a new, philosophical framework for restorative punishment through the acknowledgement of pain and the use of catharsis for internal transformation and individual empowerment. This is a powerful book that generates much needed hope. Through a multi-disciplinary dialogue that uses social sciences, criminology, law, psychology and human rights, the book opens new avenues for practitioners, researchers and policy makers internationally. (shrink)

This up-to-date resource on restorative justice theory and practice is the literature’s most comprehensive and authoritative review of original research in new and contested areas. -/- Bringing together contributors from across a range of jurisdictions, disciplines and legal traditions, this edited collection provides a concise, but critical review of existing theory and practice in restorative justice. Authors identify key developments, theoretical arguments and new empirical evidence, evaluating their merits and demerits, before turning the reader’s attention to further concerns informing and (...) improving the future of restorative justice. Divided into four parts, the Handbook includes papers written by leading scholars on new theory, empirical evidence of implementation, critiques and the future of restorative justice. -/- This companion is essential reading for scholars of restorative justice, criminology, social theory, psychology, law, human rights and criminal justice, as well as researchers, policymakers, practitioners and campaigners from around the world. (shrink)

Tyler Burge is famous for defending primitivist naturalism about mental representations, according to which mental representations are primitive natural states. Primitivist naturalism contrasts with semantic reductionism, according to which mental representations are reducible to more fundamental natural states. Burge developed the most compelling and influential attack on semantic reductionism from a primitivist naturalist point of view. My goal in this paper is to defend semantic reduc- tionism from Burge’s attack. I assess and refute his objection to the motivations for semantic (...) reductionism and his objection to the semantic reductionist theory that he takes to be the most promising one, namely, teleosemantics. I argue that in spite of the ingenuity of Burge’s objections, they fail to show that there is no motivation for taking representational states as reducible to more fundamental natural states or that the core thesis of teleosemantics is flawed. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...) Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

This study investigates how e-business capabilities and digital marketing strategies jointly influence business performance in the e-commerce industry, which has experienced unprecedented growth driven by technological advancements and changing consumer behavior. E-business capabilities encompass the use of technology and digital infrastructure, while digital marketing strategies are employed to attract and retain online customers. The study examines the effect of e-business capabilities through digital marketing strategies on the customer satisfaction and loyalty of UAE e-commerce industry. The research is descriptive and explanatory, (...) and uses a structured 5-scale Likert questionnaire to collect data from the HR managers of 135 e-commerce companies based in UAE. The statistical analysis is performed using structural equation modeling. The findings highlight the significant relationship of the study variables. Consequently, the results of this study provide valuable insights for e-commerce businesses, elucidating the need to invest in robust e-business capabilities to support effective digital marketing efforts. Additionally, the research underscores the significance of tailoring digital marketing strategies to align with specific business objectives and customer segments. The study also contributes to the literature on digital transformation, by demonstrating how e-business capabilities and digital marketing strategies can enable e-commerce firms to adapt and thrive in the dynamic and competitive digital environment. (shrink)

What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-autistic interaction partners can (...) have difficulties interacting with each other. To do justice to these findings, we need a different approach to autistic interactions—one that helps everyone see, invite, and support better participation. I introduce such an approach, based on the enactive theory of participatory sense-making and supported by insights from indigenous epistemologies. This approach helps counteract the homogenising tendencies of the “global mental health” movement, which attempts to erase rather than recognise difference, and often precludes respectful engagements. Based in the lived experiences of people in their socio-cultural-material and interactive contexts, I put forward an engaged—even engaging—epistemology for understanding how we interact across difference. From this perspective, we see participatory sense-making at work across the scientific, diagnostic, therapeutic, and everyday interactions of autistic and non-autistic people, and how everyone can invite and support more of it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, (...) I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supp... (shrink)

Although science is our most reliable producer of knowledge, it can also be used to create ignorance, unjustified doubt, and misinformation. In doing so, agnotological practices result not only in epistemic harms but also in social ones. A way to prevent or minimise such harms is to impede these ignorance-producing practices. In this paper, I explore various challenges to such a proposal. I first argue that reliably identifying agnotological practices in a way that permits the prevention of relevant harms is (...) more difficult than it might appear. I focus on an identifying criterion that many find apt for the task: bad faith motives. I then consider an objection—that reliable criteria are unnecessary to successfully address the concerns raised by agnotological strategies—and I show that it fails. I conclude by exploring other ways of conceptualising the problems attributed to agnotological practices. In particular, I challenge the focus on misinformation as the main problem of concern. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, (...) as well as any other metaphysical views about the ultimate nature of qualia. The reworking of the displaced perception model I am proposing is supposed to be compatible with any available metaphysical view on qualia. The second step consists of rejecting the epistemological misgivings of the original model, namely the view that knowing qualia requires “connecting beliefs” along with “meta-representations.” Yet, Dretske’s crucial mistake has been to force knowledge of qualia into the “belief-box.” As a matter of fact, there is only one belief involved in introspecting qualia, namely the qualia-belief itself. The third final step is this. Assuming the key Wittgensteinian insight, I argue that introspection of qualia is a process that is both epis- temically reliable and automatic. It is reliable because it dispenses with justification of any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, it is automatic because it also dispenses with reflexive connecting beliefs. For example, it takes nonconceptual awareness of the color blue as an input and automatically yields the belief that phenomenal blue is the conscious character of my experience of the sky as an output just by employing the concept BLUE. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higher-order cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view.” In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent (...) objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject. (shrink)

In this research, an agent-based model was developed to study the propagation of physical climate shocks through supply chain networks. By combining supply chain and financial models, the study examines the effects of climate shocks on firms’ production capacities and their subsequent impacts on firm default risk. A comprehensive mathematical framework is presented for the simulation of physical risks, their subsequent up- and downstream impacts along the supply chain, and the translation of physical impacts into an increased level of default (...) risk. The results highlight the importance of supply chains as a transmission channel for physical climate risks and emphasize the effectiveness of implementing adaptation measures. Practical examples demonstrate the model’s behavior under different hypothetical climate scenarios and identify the sectors most vulnerable to increases in the frequency and intensity of climate events. Overall, this study provides insights into the transmission dynamics of climate shocks and emphasizes the need for resilience against climate events in supply chain networks. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of intransitive self-consciousness and second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. In an (...) adverbial theory of perception, we do not see a blue sense-data, but we see something blue-ly, whereas in intransitive self-consciousness, we are not conscious of ourselves when we undergo a conscious experience—instead, we experience something self-consciously. But what does this mean precisely? First, I take intransitive self-consciousness to be the first-person operator that prefixes the content of any experience that the subject undergoes, regardless of whether or not the subject is self-referred. Further, I argue that this first-person adverbial way of entertaining the content of any experience in Perry’s revised framework fixes the subject as part of the circumstance of the evaluation of the content of her own experience. We can only evaluate whether the content is veridical or falsidical relative to the subject undergoing the experience. This is referred to here as “self-concernment without self-reference.” When I am absorbed in reading a book, I do not self-represent my own experience of reading a book, let alone see myself as a constituent of the content of this experience. Even so, I experience that reading self-consciously in the precise sense that I do belong to the circumstance of the evaluation of the selfless content of my experience of reading the book. The content of the experience of reading a book is simply a propositional function, true or false of myself. (shrink)

We set forth what one may call a “constitutional reading” in opposition to the traditional widespread “constructivist reading” of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come (...) to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent (“the constitutional view”) are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional “two-worlds view” reading of Kant’s idealism. If we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

I argue for a new reading of Pyrrhonian beliefs inspired by representationalism (the content view) in recent philosophy of mind. I shall argue that there are two senses of acceptance or “acquiescence in something” (eudokein tini pragmati) rather than two senses of belief (doxa). For this reason, we can maintain along with Sextus that the Pyrrhonian skeptic behaves intentionally and can live his life in society adoxastôs without any proper beliefs whatsoever. However, the skeptical sense of acceptance is not the (...) mere avowal of a feeling or a mere report or register of the way things appear to me. I want to suggest the following reading. Acceptance without belief is an anti-predicative passive and involuntary acceptance of content by means of an indicator function (pathos or phainomenon) in virtue of the past regular connection between the representational content and the indicator function. The pathos (as a present state of mind) or the phainomenon “means” (that is, indicates) passively and involuntarily a content in virtue of its regular connection with this content through time. For example, the Pyrrhonian’s acceptance of the content of the sentence “there is fire” is based on the fact that he here and now perceives smoke and that pathos passively and involuntarily means (represents) the content that there is fire. There is no judgment involved at all: even when the skeptic suspends his judgment (epochê) about whether there is fire, his pathos makes him involuntarily accept that there is fire. That is what Sextus, following the Stoic tradition, calls “commemorative signs” (hupomnêstikon) in opposition to the so-called “indicative signs” (endeiktikon), namely the “internal assertion” of the content as a belief (as a propositional attitude). As I do not believe that any reasonable reading of the skeptical acceptance may be defended only by means of philological analysis and by the research of the huge doxography, my arguments deliberately mix historical evidence with reasons of a systematic nature. In this way, the defense of my alternative reading is abductive, namely as the inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

This article presents a dual purpose: to carefully consider objections against the existentialist conception of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids such objections, specifically addressing the so-called "problem of particularity." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience should be understood as relativized, being incomplete content (rather than classical, complete propositions), modeled as a function of the sextuple of the object, agent, time, place, causal relation, and world (...) to absolute values. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS) and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism ([2006], [2010] p. 111). On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all, not even a thin, non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed [2012]. When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.

Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by different readings of what I want to call here Bermúdez’s conditions on content-attribution (2007). In one read- ing, what is required is a neo-Fregean content to solve problems of cognitive significance at the nonconceptual level (Toribio, 2008; Duhau, 2011). In the other reading, what is required is a neo-Russellian or possible-world content to account for how conspecifics join attention and cooperate, contemplating the same things from different perspectives in the same perceptual field. (...) The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism: there is no such thing as the content of experience. According to content pragmatism, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather, it is a term of art that semanticists use, as a matter of theoretical convenience, to classify mental states. What follows from Content-pragmatism is Content- pluralism: there are so many contents that are required to meet Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution. Because both criticism and the defense of State conceptualism overlook the real scope of Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution, they are ineffective. In this paper, I will argue that the opposition between State and Content nonconceptualism is a real one, but only a relative one, that is, relative to the opposite constraints to be met. If we want to solve the problems of cognitive significance, the best we can do is to let the content of experience be modeled as neo-Fregean content, namely, a compound of nonconceptual modes of presentation of objects and properties. In this case, Content-nonconceptualism prevails. In contrast, if we want to account for how conspecifics join attention to the same entities in the same perceptual field from different perspectives, the best we can do is let the content of experience be modeled either as a structured Russellian proposition or as a function from possible worlds to truth-values. In this case, State-nonconceptualism prevails. (shrink)

This study delves into the feasibility of introducing a market in Barangay Tanagan, Calatagan, Batangas, with a primary focus on assessing its viability and potential impact on local economic development. Utilizing survey questionnaires and employing statistical analysis techniques, the research gathered data from a carefully selected sample of 366 residents out of the total population of 4,224. The study evaluates both the potential benefits and challenges associated with establishing the proposed market. Findings, subjected to thorough analysis through methods such as (...) frequency counts and weighted mean calculations, provide valuable insights into discernible patterns, emerging trends, and relevant correlations. This analytical approach contributes to a pragmatic perspective that informs and guides future studies in the field. The study reveals an interest among respondents in the establishment of public markets in their vicinity, recognizing its potential to bolster the barangay and attract diverse opportunities. The anticipated positive impact extends to fostering economic growth and enhancing local commerce in Barangay Tanagan. Consequently, based on these compelling findings, the researchers advocate for a proposal outlining the establishment of a public market in Barangay Tanagan as a means of addressing the identified needs and aspirations of the community. (shrink)

Human rights and restorative justice are rarely brought under the same spotlight despite their normative similarities. In fact, this gap becomes even more apparent when put in the context of policy and practice internationally. Firstly, there is a developing gap between public perception and evidence-based depiction of crime. Secondly, scholarly debates are rarely reflected in criminal justice policy and legislation. This failure has an impact on recidivism, the spiralling costs of penal interventions, but most importantly on how we view our (...) interpersonal and inter-communal relationships. -/- This unique collection of papers brings together international leading experts in human rights and restorative justice to address a gap in the literature. From reconstructing and restorative human rights for restorative justice to addressing issues such as the standardisation of restorative justice, this edited volume is a must read for researchers, practitioners and campaigners. (shrink)